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Note
BONGHiTS4JESUS.COM?
Scrutinizing Public School Authority over
Student Cyberspeech Through the Lens of
Personal Jurisdiction
Kyle W. Brenton*
Self-expression on the Internet has become a way of life for
twenty-first century students. From e-mail to instant messaging to social networking websites like Facebook, MySpace, and
LiveJournal, a significant amount of student speech has become cyberspeech. 1 As student speech moves online, schools follow. Afraid their school might become another Columbine, 2
administrators have begun to monitor student online expression, and try to censor student speech they regard as improper. 3 Unfortunately, school administrators lack a strong incentive to protect the free speech rights of their students-they are
more concerned with preserving the integrity of the educational
process against perceived threats. 4 Protecting student speech is
• J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; M.F.A.,
2002, American Repertory Theatre/Moscow Art Theatre School Institute for
Advanced Theatre Training at Harvard University; B.A., 2000, Vanderbilt
University. The author would like to thank Professor Dale Carpenter for his
invaluable advice and Professor William McGeveran for his excellent comments on an earlier draft. The author also thanks the board and staff of the
Minnesota Law Review, notably Abigail Allen, Jenni Vainik, Kevin O'Riordan,
and Chrissy Rittberg. Finally, the author thanks Amy for her unflagging love
and support. Copyright © 2008 by Kyle W. Brenton.
1. See AMANDA LENHART & MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE
PROJECT, TEENS, PRIVACY & ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS 11-12 (2007), http://
www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPTeensPrivacySNS-ReportFinal.pdf.
2. On April 20, 1999, two students at Columbine High School went on a
shooting spree, killing twelve students and one teacher. See Michael Janofsky,
Year Later, Columbine Is Learning to Cope While Still Searching for Answers,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2000, at A12.
3. Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Columbine Fallout: The LongTerm Effects on Free Expression Take Hold in Public Schools, 83 B.U. L. REV.
1089, 1091 (2003).
4. Id. at 1120-21.
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a task for the courts, but constitutional jurisprudence provides
only the vaguest outline for deciding when a particular student's cyberspeech may constitutionally be regulated by the
school. 5 The overreaching of school administrators online is a
growing problem, and in the absence of clear judicial standards
for evaluating their actions, it will continue to worsen.
In Morse v. Frederick,6 the Supreme Court recently upheld
the suspension of Joseph Frederick, a student at JuneauDouglas High School (JDHS) in Alaska, for displaying a banner7
reading "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" at a school-sponsored event.
The Court held that, consonant with its mission to discourage
drug use, a school could censor on-campus student speech advocating the use of illegal drugs.8 What if, however, instead of a
banner, Frederick created a website, BONGHiTS4JESUS.com
(BH4J.com)? Could Principal Morse punish Frederick or insist
that the site be taken down? Consider four scenarios:
In the first, Frederick creates BH4J.com entirely on his
home computer, and not during school hours. The site advocates for the decriminalization of marijuana, and presents a
reasoned argument for why biblical principles support legalization. Frederick never tells anyone at school about the site, but
Principal Morse accidentally discovers it while running Google
searches on random JDHS students. 9
In the second scenario, during a computer lab class at
school, Frederick accesses BH4J.com and shows it to the student sitting next to him. Word of the site quietly spreads

5. See generally Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. &

TECH. L. 243 (2001) (examining when disciplinary action may be taken against
students who engage in on- and off-campus cyberspeech); Rita J. Verga, Policing Their Space: The FirstAmendment Parametersof School Discipline of Student Cyberspeech, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 727 (2007)

(same).
6.

127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).

7. Id. at 2622-23.
8. Id. at 2629 ("The 'special characteristics of the school environment,'
and the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse . . . allow

schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use." (citation omitted)).
9. Though purely hypothetical, this fact pattern addresses the ambiguity
between Morse-style speech advocating illegal drug use and protected political
and religious speech. See id. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the distinction between advocating illegal drug use and political advocacy for the legalization of marijuana).
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through the school, and though no significant activity occurs,
the "buzz" reaches the ears of Principal Morse. 10
In the third hypothetical situation, rather than offering
commentary on drug legalization, Frederick uses BH4J.com to
post a detailed floor plan of JDHS with emergency exits
marked. He posts a clock that counts down to a particular
day-below the clock is a caption reading "those of you who
know have your instructions." He never accesses the website at
school, but one of his classmates who he tells about the site reports it to Principal Morse.11
Finally, consider a hypothetical in which Frederick fills
BH4J.com with derogatory comments about JDHS faculty and
staff. One page is particularly dedicated to Principal Morse,
and questions her qualifications, harshly criticizes her appearance in juvenile and shocking language, and speculates on the
virtues of her dropping dead of a heart attack. Frederick never
accesses the site at school, but e-mails fifteen of his friends and
classmates the link from his home computer.12
Under which of these fact patterns would Principal Morse
be constitutionally justified in censoring Frederick's website, or
punishing him because of it? This Note aims to answer these
questions. When does a student's online expression become
"student speech" such that the school may suppress it or punish
its speaker? In the context of the Internet, what is "student
speech"?
Part I of this Note sets forth the jurisprudential framework
that governs school regulation of student speech, and considers
cases addressing the First Amendment status of student online
speech, or "cyberspeech." Part II focuses on the threshold inquiry of whether student cyberspeech is student speech and
finds that few courts meaningfully consider the initial conditions under which off-campus cyberspeech becomes vulnerable
to school regulation. Courts that do consider these initial condi10. The "dissemination" of the website in this hypothetical is analogous to
the facts of Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 496 F.
Supp. 2d 587, 591-92 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
11. While entirely hypothetical, recent outbreaks of school violence make
this scenario chillingly plausible. See, e.g., Christopher Maag, Short but
Troubled Life of a High School Student Ended in Shooting and Suicide, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007, at A21 (recounting the story of a Cleveland student who
shot two students and two teachers and then committed suicide).
12. This permutation combines the facts of J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School
District, 807 A.2d 847, 851 (Pa. 2002), and Wisniewski v. Board of Education,
494 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2007).
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tions reach inconsistent outcomes based on content-based evaluations. Finally, Part III argues that courts must apply a more
rigorous test to evaluate 'the nexus between cyberspeech and
the school environment. To determine whether schools may regulate off-campus cyberspeech, courts should apply a version of
the personal jurisdiction test to ensure that any exercise of
school power over student cyberspeech is supported by minimum contacts with the school environment such that the exercise of the school power does not offend notions of fair play and
substantial justice.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON CAMPUS AND ONLINE
The First Amendment to the Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech."'13 The speech protected by the First Amendment extends beyond spoken words and encompasses the full range of
communicative human behavior-from holding up a banner or
flag, 14 to wearing particular clothing, 15 to remaining silent.' 6
Three overlapping policy values support and justify the freedom of speech. First is a belief that truth is best served when
all points of view can be discussed-in Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes' words, "the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."'17 Second is the contention that free speech is essential to
democracy-that the framers designed the First Amendment in
part "to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."' 8
Third, freedom of speech is essential to individual autonomyas Justice Louis Brandeis argued, freedom of speech forces the
government to "make men free to develop their faculties."'19
When a court strikes down a law on First Amendment grounds,
13.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

14. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361, 369-70 (1931) (reversing a conviction under a state statute banning the display of the red Commun-

ist flag of Soviet Russia).
15.

See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16-19 (1971) (reversing the con-

viction of an individual who wore a jacket bearing the slogan "Fuck the Draft"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
16. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (extending First
Amendment protection to the right "to protest by silent and reproachful presence").
17. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
18. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
19. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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it does so not just because of the speech directly affected by the
that the
law, but also because of the potential "chilling effect"
20
law will have on those who might otherwise speak.
However, the right of free expression under the First
Amendment is not absolute. The government may restrict the
time, place, and manner of speech, as long as that restriction is
reasonable, "narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest," leaves open "ample alternative channels for
communication," and applies "without reference to the content
of the regulated speech." 2 1 Additionally, some narrowly defined
types of speech enjoy no First Amendment protection whatsoever-among them incitement to commit a crime, 2 2 so-called
fighting words,2 3 libelous speech, 24 obscenity, 25 child pornography, 26 and "true threats" of violence. 27 Finally, while the Con-

stitution permits some speech regulation that applies without
regard to the speech's content, regulations based on content are
28
subject to the highest degree of judicial scrutiny.
20.

FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2682-83 n.5 (2007)

(Scalia, J., concurring) ("Our normal practice is to assess ex ante the risk that
a standard will have an impermissible chilling effect on First Amendment protected speech.").
21. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 295
(1984) (affirming the National Park Service's enforcement of a camping ordinance against protesters sleeping in a public park).
22. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (forbidding states
from prohibiting advocacy of unlawful activity "except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action").
23. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding
that words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace" are not protected).
24. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) ("We find no
warrant in the Constitution for denying to Illinois the power to pass [a criminal libel law]."). But cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)
("[L]ibel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It
must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.").
25. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("This much has been
categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the
First Amendment.").
26. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding that content-based restrictions on the distribution of child pornography do not offend
the First Amendment).
27. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003) (upholding a state
statute forbidding cross-burning with the intent to intimidate as a "true
threat," such as, a "statement[] where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
28. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972)
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A. PROTECTION OF STUDENT EXPRESSION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

The Supreme Court recognized that the First Amendment
protects the speech of public school students in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette.29 The Court acknowledged that while a school has "important, delicate, and highly
discretionary" educational functions, it nevertheless remains a
state actor bound by the Fourteenth Amendment to respect
students' First Amendment rights. 30 Justice Robert Jackson's
opinion forbade, in the starkest terms, any attempt on the part
of schools "to strangle the free mind at its source." 31 Since Barnette, the Supreme Court has issued a series of rulings clarifying and delineating the scope of students' First Amendment
rights in public schools: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,32 Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser,33 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,34 and most
recently Morse v. Frederick.35
1. The High-Water Mark: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District
In 1965 in Des Moines, Iowa, three students were suspended for wearing black armbands to school as a silent protest
against the Vietnam War. 36 Their parents challenged the

school's action in a case that set the standard for the protection
of student speech. The Court began by asserting that "[i]t can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate." 37 The Court also recognized that the rights

of students must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment," and that schools require some
control over student behavior. 38 To balance these competing in("[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it
finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more
controversial views.").
29. 319 U.S. 624, 628-29, 642 (1943) (holding that a school could not compel Jehovah's Witnesses to recite the Pledge of Allegiance).
30. Id. at 637.
31. Id.
32. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
33. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
34. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
35. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
36. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
37. Id. at 506.
38. Id. at 506-07.
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terests, the Court held that the Constitution forbade regulation
of student speech unless it would "materially and substantially
39
interfere" with the school environment.
The Court rejected the argument that the school officials
were moved to act by a justified fear of a potential disruption
and held that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression."40 While a school could act to prevent a foreseeable dis-

ruption, in the Court's view, "state-operated schools may not be
enclaves of totalitarianism."'41 Tinker thus set a very high bar
for determining when a school might curtail the First Amendment rights of a student: a school may exercise such authority
only when the speech or conduct would "materially and sub42
stantially interfere" with the administration of the school.
2. Exceptions to the Rule: Fraser& Hazelwood
Nearly twenty years after Tinker, the Court returned to
the issue of student speech in two cases decided two years
apart. Taken together, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 43 and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier44 create substantial exceptions to the Tinker rule and establish new zones
in which the First Amendment does not protect student
45
speech.
The first case arose when Matthew Fraser, a Bethel High
School student, gave a speech at a school-sponsored assembly
in support of his friend's campaign for a student government
46
position, which was couched in an elaborate sexual metaphor.
39.
1966))
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 508.
Id. at 511.
See id. at 509 (internal quotation marks omitted).

43. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
44. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
45. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First
Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates: What's Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE
L. REV. 527 (2000) (arguing that Fraser and Hazelwood effectively overrule
Tinker).
46. Fraser,478 U.S. at 677-78. In his concurrence, Justice William Brennan partially reproduced the speech:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his
shirt, his character is firm-but most ...

of all, his belief in you, the

students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point
and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the
wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and
pushing until finally-he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the
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The next day, Fraser was suspended from school for three days
for violating the school's disruptive conduct rule. 47 The Court

conceded that Fraser's speech had not been obscene within the
meaning of Miller v. California,48 and so merited First
Amendment protection. 49 But the Court did not base its ruling
on the Tinker standard. 50 The Court held that the school-in
light of its mission to inculcate "fundamental values of habits
and manners of civility essential to a democratic society"-had
"would underthe power to ban "vulgar and lewd speech" that
51
mine the school's basic educational mission."
Two years later, the Court created a second exception to
the Tinker rule, when the principal of Hazelwood East High
52
School in St. Louis, Missouri censored a student newspaper.
The Court again declined to apply the Tinker test.53 Because

the newspaper was part of the curriculum, "[e]ducators are entitled to exercise greater control over [it] to assure that ...the

views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed
to the school." 54 Hazelwood thus articulated a second broad ex-

ception to the Tinker rule: a student's speech may be censored
55
when it might reasonably be mistaken for that of the school.

very end-even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for

Jeff for A. S. B. vice-president-he'll never come between you and the
best our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 678 (majority opinion). Fraser's name was also removed from
the ballot to elect graduation speakers; his classmates nevertheless elected
him by write-in vote. Id. at 678-79.
48. 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
49. Fraser,478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring).
50. The majority did not even consider the Tinker disruption test, and instead distinguished the political conduct at issue in Tinker from the sexual innuendo of Fraser's speech. Id. at 685 (majority opinion); see also Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2627 (2007) ("Whatever approach Fraseremployed, it
certainly did not conduct the 'substantial disturbance' analysis prescribed by
Tinker.").
51. Fraser,478 U.S. at 681, 685 (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988).
53. Id. at 270-71.
54. Id. at 271.
55. Id. at 273 ("[W]e hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
").
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities ....
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3. A New Exception: Morse v. Frederick
The third exception to Tinker came recently in Morse v.
Frederick.56 In considering whether the Constitution permitted
Principal Morse's punishment of Frederick for his "BONG HiTS
4 JESUS" banner, the Court first rejected the argument that,
because Frederick planted his banner off school property, the
school-speech precedents did not apply. 57 The Court admitted
that "[t]here is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to
when courts should apply school-speech precedents, but not on
these facts."58 Because the event was school-sanctioned, school

personnel were present, "[t]he high school band and cheerleaders performed," and Frederick directed his banner at the school,
the Court held that he was effectively at school. 59 The Court
then established that, although Frederick did not intend to
convey a pro-drug message, 60 since there were at least two reasonable pro-drug interpretations, 61 Morse's conclusion that
Frederick's banner advocated drug use was nevertheless reasonable. 62 Finally, the Court concluded that "[t]he special characteristics of the school environment and the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse ... allow schools to

restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as
promoting illegal drug use." 63 Thus, the Morse Court carved out

a third exception to the Tinker standard: a school may freely

64
restrict student speech that promotes illegal drug use.

B. STUDENTS, THE INTERNET, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The exponential growth of Internet access over the past
decades has led to an unprecedented number of students expressing themselves online. At the same time, schools have increasingly ventured onto the Internet to monitor and sometimes punish students' cyberspeech. The First Amendment

56. 127 S.Ct. 2618 (2007).
57. Id. at 2624 (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Id. (citation omitted).
59. Id.
60. Frederick insisted that the slogan was meaningless; he just wanted to
get on television. Id.
61. The two possible interpretations are the imperative statement "[Take]
bong hits,"' and one of the following declarative statements: 'bong hits [are a
good thing],' or '[we take] bong hits."' Id. at 2625 (alterations in original).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2629 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
64. See id.
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fully protects speech posted on or delivered via the Internet, 65
but the extent to which it protects the off-campus online speech
of students remains unsettled. 66 The balance of this Part addresses the phenomenon of student Internet speech, and considers some of the cases in which schools have attempted to regulate that speech.
1.

The Explosion of Student Expression Online

Today's high school students were born around 1990, the
year computer scientists invented the World Wide Web protocol. 67 When current high school students were in first grade,
the Palm Pilot had been invented. 68 By the time they started
middle school, Wikipedia was up and running. 69 In high school,
they spend their time listening to podcasts, photo sharing on
sites like Flickr, and watching YouTube videos. 70 According to a
survey conducted by the Pew Internet and American Life
Project, ninety-three percent of American teens use the Inter71
net, and sixty-one percent do so daily.
None of the Internet phenomena that have arisen over the
course of today's teenagers' lives has had a greater impact,
however, than the explosion of social networking websites like
MySpace, Friendster, and Facebook. 72 Teenagers use social
networking sites like these to build personal profiles and webpages, which in turn they use to maintain and grow their circle
of online and offline friends. 73 Fifty-five percent of young people
65. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) ("[Our cases provide
no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be
applied to [the Internet].").
66. See, e.g., Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 45455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (discussing cases that have analyzed off-campus online
student speech).
67. Cf. Amanda Lenhart, Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, Policy & Advocacy in the Schools Meeting: A Timeline of Teens and Technology (Aug. 16,
2007), http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/105/presentation-display.asp (follow
'View PowerPoint Presentation" hyperlink) [hereinafter Lenhart, Timeline].
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. LENHART & MADDEN, supra note 1, at 3.
72. See Chad Lorenz, The Death of E-mail, SLATE, Nov. 14, 2007, http://
www.slate.com/id/2177969 (observing that teenagers are abandoning e-mail in
favor of instant messaging and the communication systems of social networking websites).
73. See AMANDA LENHART & MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE
PROJECT, SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES AND TEENS: AN OVERVIEw 1 (2007),

http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPSNSDataMemoJan_2007.pdf.
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aged 12-17 and sixty-one percent of those aged 14-17 utilize
social networking websites. 74 These websites provide a variety
of tools for communication, both public and private.7 5 Accountholders may use the website's private messaging system to
communicate with friends, or may post messages on a friend's
"wall," a public bulletin board that any visitor to the profile
page may read.7 6 Such wall postings are the most popular method of communication on social networking sites; 84% of teen
users report having posted to a wall.7 7 Finally, 57% of online
78
teens reported posting self-created content.
2.

Student Cyberspeech in the Lower Courts

The explosion of student expression online has brought a
concomitant expansion of opportunities for schools to regulate
that expression. The discontinuity between geographical space
and cyberspace, however, confounds traditional analysis of the
scope of school power to regulate student speech. 79 Web content
created in one location can be instantaneously accessed anywhere in the world, thus undermining the spatial link between
a student's expression and its reception.8 0
But geography remains relevant to a school's claim of authority, because Tinker and its progeny do not necessarily apply beyond the schoolhouse gates.8 1 Courts have addressed stu-

74.

LENHART & MADDEN, supra note 1, at 11-12.

75.

See id. at 13.

76.

Id.

77.
78.
79.

Id.
Lenhart, Timeline, supra note 67.
See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of

Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996) ("Global computerbased communications cut across territorial borders, creating a new realm of
human activity and undermining the feasibility-and legitimacy-of laws
based on geographic boundaries."); Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger,
Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: The First Amendment in an Online World,
28 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1137 (1996) ("[A]s courts... struggle to apply a correct
jurisprudential paradigm to the Internet, it has become apparent that the
First Amendment law developed for other communications media provides
precious few analytical analogs.").
80. See Johnson & Post, supra note 79, at 1370 ("Cyberspace radically undermines the relationship between legally significant (online) phenomena and
physical location.").
81. See Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 800-01 (N.D.
Ohio 2002) ("[U]nder Tinker, . . .the school district must show that [the student's] expressive activity 'materially and substantially interfere[d] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."' (third
alteration in original)).
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dent cyberspeech at four points along the spatial axis between
the campus and the home. First, cyberspeech that occurs unambiguously off campus, or is brought onto campus only by a
third party, has usually been placed beyond the school's power
to regulate. Second, in cases in which the online speech originates off campus but is brought onto campus by the speaker,
courts have reached diametrically opposed conclusions in similar factual situations. The third category encompasses speech
that originates on campus, which has been held regulable. Finally, off-campus cyberspeech that poses a foreseeable risk of
reaching campus has recently been ruled within the school's
authority to censor.
a.

Off-Campus Cyberspeech

When a school attempts to regulate the off-campus, online
speech of a student, its authority is at its lowest ebb. Emmett v.
Kent School District No. 41582 demonstrates this phenomenon.
From his home computer, Nick Emmett maintained a website
where he posted mock obituaries, written tongue-in-cheek,
about his friends.8 3 He also allowed site visitors to vote for who
would "die" next.8 4 After a local television station ran a story on
the site characterizing it as a "hit list,"8 5 Emmett was expelled
from school for "intimidation, harassment, [and] disruption to
the educational process." 8 6 The school district argued that, in
the post-Columbine environment, school administrators should
be granted wide latitude to monitor and regulate student
speech.8 7 The court, however, rejected this argument.8 8 In
granting an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the punishment, the court placed Emmett's website "entirely outside of
the school's supervision or control."8 9
A more complicated issue arises when a student's cyberspeech is brought onto campus by another student. In Killion v.
82. 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
83. Id. at 1089. These posts were an extension of an activity that began in
Emmett's creative writing class the year before. Id.
84. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Id. Emmett's expulsion was subsequently changed to a five-day suspension. Id.
87. See id. at 1090.
88. Id. ("[The school district] has presented no evidence that the mock obituaries and voting on this [website] were intended to threaten anyone, did actually threaten anyone, or manifested any violent tendencies whatsoever.").
89. Id.
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Franklin Regional School District,90 Zachariah Paul wrote a
"Top Ten" list mocking the school's athletic director and emailed it to a number of friends. 91 He specifically did not, however, bring it to school, because he had been warned against
bringing such lists on campus. 92 Despite his precautions, someone printed Paul's e-mail and copies were found in the teacher's
lounge resulting in Paul being suspended for ten days. 93 The
court granted an injunction against the school, applying the
Tinker test. 94 In the court's estimation, "[tihe overwhelming
weight of authority has analyzed student speech (whether on or
off campus) in accordance with Tinker. Further, because the
[athletic director] list was brought on campus, albeit by an unknown person, Tinker applies." 95 Under Tinker, however, the
96
court found no likelihood of disruption.
Other cases in which student cyberspeech has been
brought on campus by a third party have reached similar conclusions, relying on the Tinker substantial disruption standard. 97 Whether or not a student brings her speech onto cam98
pus, it may be subject to regulation.
b.

Cyberspeech Brought onto Campus by the Speaker

In contrast to cases in which a student's speech is brought
on campus against the student's will, courts are likely to
uphold a school's regulatory authority when a student accesses
off-campus web content from school computers during school
hours. The courts have little guidance, however, in deciding
how much on-campus access is enough to support the school's
authority. In two cases, courts examined similar situations and
came to opposite conclusions.
90.

136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001).

91.

Id. at 448 (internal quotation marks omitted).

92. Id.
93. Id. at 448-49.
94. Id. at 452-56 (analyzing the facts of Killion under the Tinker standard).
95.
96.

Id. at 455.
Id. at 455-56.

97.

See, e.g., Latour v. Riverside Beaver Sch. Dist., No. Civ. A. 05-1076,

2005 WL 2106562, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2005) (denying school's right to

discipline a student for apparently violent rap lyrics and songs posted online
and brought to school by other students); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch.
Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1178-82 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (granting a preliminary

injunction against a school disciplining a student for the content of a website
pointed out to a teacher by another student).
98. See Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
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Justin Swidler 99 created a website called "Teacher Sux,"
which contained derogatory statements directed at his teachers.10 0 He specifically targeted his algebra teacher Mrs. Fulmer;
the website gave a list of reasons why she should die and solicited donations "to help pay for the hitman."''1 1 Justin showed
the site to another student once during class.10 2 When Mrs.
Fulmer learned of the site, she suffered extreme emotional disturbance-she could not finish the school year-and Justin was
suspended. 10 3 When Justin's parents sued, the intermediate
appellate court upheld the school's actions because the court
found that Swidler's speech constituted a threat that "materially and substantially interfere[d] with the educational process,"
and thus was not protected by the First Amendment. 0 4 While
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Justin's website
was not a true threat, 0 5 it nevertheless upheld the punishment
under Tinker. 0 6 The court found that Swidler "facilitated the
on-campus nature of the speech" by accessing the site at school
and showing it to his friends.' 0 7 Finally, the court held that
suspension was justified because the disruption of the school
08
was so severe.'
A few years after J.S., another Justin-Justin Layshockcreated a fake profile of his principal on MySpace.com. 109 Like
Swidler, Layshock showed the profile to classmates; he also ac-

99. J.S.'s full name is revealed in Calvert, supra note 5, at 246.
100. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 851 (Pa. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Id. (quoting the "Teacher Sux" website) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 852.
Id.
Id. at 853.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 858-60.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 865.
Id. at 869.
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d

587, 591 (W.D. Pa. 2007).

The answers [to MySpace's default profile questions] ranged from
nonsensical answers to silly questions on the one hand, to crude juvenile language on the other. For example, in response to the question,
'in the past month have you smoked?,' the profile says 'big blunt.' ...
The answer to the question 'in the past month have you gone on a
date?' is 'big hard-on.' The profile also refers to [the principal] as a 'big
steroid freak' and 'big whore.' The profile also reflected that [the principal] was 'too drunk to remember' the date of his birthday.
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cessed the profile from school computers twice. 110 When the
administration learned of Layshock's profile, he was suspended
from school, placed in the Alternative Curriculum Education
program for the remainder of the year, suspended from extracurricular activities, and prohibited from participating in his
class's graduation ceremony."' In considering whether or not
the school had properly punished Justin, the court noted that
"[t]he mere fact that the internet may be accessed at school
does not authorize school officials to become censors of the
world-wide web." 112 The court placed the burden on the school
to justify its power to punish Layshock. 1 13 In the court's estima4
tion, the school failed to carry that burden.1
J.S. and Layshock therefore present identical operative
facts: web content created off campus that was accessed by the
author on campus." 5 In one case, the school's authority was
upheld;" 6 in the other, it was denied." 7 This divergence suggests a need for uniform standards whereby judges may determine the limits of school authority over student cyberspeech.
c.

Cyberspeech Createdon Campus
The third point on the geographical axis of student cyberspeech is speech created on campus. In such a case courts
uphold the school's authority to regulate the speech. While
there are no reported cases involving purely on-campus cyberspeech, Doninger v. Niehoff" 8 offers a suggestive example.
Avery Doninger, frustrated over her school's refusal to allow
the student council to hold a music festival in the newly renovated auditorium, wrote an e-mail protesting the decision and
sent it to the parents of many students from the school's computer lab." 9 Later that day, she reposted the text of the e-mail
110. Id. at 591-92.
111. Id. at 593-94. After a status conference with the court, Layshock was
placed back into regular classes and was permitted to take part in the graduation ceremony. Id. at 594.
112. Id. at 597.
113. See id. at 600.
114. Id. ("[The school district has] not established a sufficient nexus between Justin's speech and a substantial disruption of the school environment.").
115. See id. at 591-92; J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847,
850-52 (Pa. 2002).
116. J.S., 807 A.2d at 869.
117. Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 600-01.
118. 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007).
119. Id. at 204-05.
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on her personal website at LiveJournal.com. 120 In response to
the LiveJournal.com posting, her principal barred Avery from
running for class secretary her senior year. 12 1 Although Avery's
punishment for the e-mail itself was limited to a verbal scolding and a temporary note placed in her student file, 122 the court
noted that the Tinker line of cases gave school administrators
wide latitude in sanctioning Avery for her on-campus, online
123
expression.
d.

Speech That May ForeseeablyReach Campus

The Doninger court also justified Avery's punishment under a powerful Second Circuit precedent that expands the
bounds of school authority, 124 Wisniewski v. Board of Education.125 After being told that his school would take all allegations of threats very seriously,126 eighth-grader Aaron Wisniewski created an AOL Instant Messenger icon on his home
computer that depicted a gun shooting a person, and included
the caption "Kill Mr. VanderMolen."' 27 During the three-week
period in which he used the icon, Wisniewski chatted with fifteen of his "buddies," but never at school. 128 When one of Wisniewski's classmates told Mr. VanderMolen of the icon, the
school suspended Wisniewski for a semester. 129 The Second

120. Id. at 206.
121. Id. at 207-08. As the court pointed out, the denial of a privilege is
substantively different from a more severe punishment, such as suspension or
expulsion, which would implicate a constitutionally protected property interest. Id. at 213-14; cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650, 66465 (1995) (holding that students who participate in school athletics voluntarily
subject themselves to a higher degree of regulation, and random drug tests of
team members do not violate the Fourth Amendment). However, for the purpose of this analysis, Avery's conduct was such that, jurisdictionally, the
school could have meted out a more severe punishment.
122. See Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 211 ("The Court also will not consider any First Amendment claims related to discipline for the original Jamfest
email, given that the only alleged discipline, the activity log entry, has been
removed from Avery's file.").
123. See id. at 211-12 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 681-85 (1986) and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506-13 (1969)).
124. See id. at 216-17.
125. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
126. Id. at 36.
127. Id. at 35-36 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. VanderMolen
was an English teacher at Wisniewski's school. Id. at 36.
128. Id. at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id. at 36-37.
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Circuit held that, given the content of the icon, Wisniewski's
distribution of it, and the period of time that Wisniewski used
it, it was reasonably foreseeable that the icon would make its
way onto campus and come to the attention of school authorities. 130 The court concluded that "the icon, once made known
to... school officials, would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption."'13 1 Under Wisniewski, therefore, a school
can regulate cyberspeech not only if it reasonably forecasts
substantial disruption based on on-campus speech; it may do so
if it reasonably forecasts that the potentially disruptive speech
might reach the campus.

13 2

II. TRIPPING OVER THE THRESHOLD QUESTION: WHEN
IS STUDENT CYBERSPEECH "STUDENT SPEECH?"
If, indeed, there is "some uncertainty" about when to apply
the Court's school-speech precedents, as Chief Justice John Roberts indicated in Morse v. Frederick,133 student cyberspeech
brings that uncertainty into sharp relief. As this Part elucidates, Supreme Court student speech precedent has dealt with
on-campus expression, but it does not control the question of
when a school may regulate a student's off-campus speech. Determining when a student's online expression becomes student
speech, which may be regulated under the Tinker line of cases,
has been left to the lower courts. In answering that threshold
question, courts have faced recurrent factual patterns across
multiple cases, but the lack of a clear standard has led to inconsistent outcomes in similar scenarios. This Part first considers the impact of Supreme Court precedent on off-campus cyberspeech, then examines a case where the distinction between
off-campus cyberspeech and on-campus behavior was unusually
clear, and the court grasped the distinction unusually well. Finally, this Part outlines the ad hoc approach most courts have

130. Id. at 39-40.
131. Id. at 40.

132. Id. at 38-39. Wisniewski's parents have filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court in order to reverse the Second Circuit's decision. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., No. 07-987
(Jan. 24, 2008), 2008 WL 261214. In the petition, the Wisniewskis ask the
Court to decide "[w]hether a public school district may lawfully punish a student for engaging in a private conversation, off of school grounds and not at an
event bearing the imprimatur of the district, merely because the subject matter of the speech relates to the District." Id. at *i.
133. 127 S.Ct. 2618, 2624 (2007).
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used in trying to answer the threshold question, and finds that
application of the Tinker test leads to content-based regulation.
A. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT DOES NOT APPLY TO OFFCAMPUS SPEECH

In Tinker, the Court relied on the "special characteristics of
the school environment" in empowering schools to regulate student speech. 134 Precisely what those characteristics are, or
what exactly makes them 'special,"' the Court left unanswered. 135 The very nature of the "material and substantial disruption" test, 136 however, strongly hints that the Court's test
permits the school to protect the integrity of the classroom environment itself. The oft-quoted central passage from the
case 13 7-that students do not "shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate"-by
negative inference implies that outside those gates, the school
should have no power to regulate student speech.13 8 Later Supreme Court cases have not faced this question. Hazelwood, for
instance, addressed only school-sponsored speech in the form a
school newspaper. 139 Fraser,where the speech at issue occurred
during an assembly, was equally agnostic on the subject of offcampus speech. 140 With Morse, the Court had an opportunity to

134. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
135. Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights?
Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 59 (1996)

(pointing out that while the Court has acknowledged that the school environment is 'special,"' it has failed to elucidate a "guiding principle" for evaluating
the nature and status of school power).
136. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
137. A search of the ALLCASES database on Westlaw with the terms "shed
their constitutional rights" & "schoolhouse gate" returned 336 cases, as of
March 12, 2008.
138. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; see also Calvert, supra note 5, at 270-71 ("Not
only did the facts in Tinker deal with in-school expression by students, but also the Court indicated it was only concerned with on-campus expression when
it reasoned [that student freedom of expression persists within the schoolhouse gate.]"); Leora Harpaz, Internet Speech and the FirstAmendment Rights
of Public School Students, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 123, 142 ("[T]he clear inference to be drawn from the Court's cases is that it is assuming the school's authority over the speech of its students ends as the student leaves the schoolhouse.").
139.

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988).

140. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986).
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deaddress off-campus speech, but declined it, and instead
1 41
clared that Joseph's banner stood functionally on campus.
In the canonical student speech cases, therefore, the threshold question of whether the school had authority to regulate
the speech never required consideration. Each incident occurred on campus-within the schoolhouse gates-such that
the school's authority was never in doubt. In cases involving
student cyberspeech, however, it is rarely clear that the speech
at issue occurs within the gates. A student who comes to school
the morning after creating a website on her home computer
does not bring the site with her, attached to her person. Supreme Court student-speech precedent, therefore, should not
apply to off-campus cyberspeech until and unless a court determines that the school's power to regulate extends far enough
to encompass it.142
B. PARSING THE DETAILS: WHAT SPEECH IS BEING PUNISHED?

The first task of a court faced with a school's claim of authority over student cyberspeech is to determine what speech,
precisely, is being regulated. Many cyberspeech cases involve
deceptively simple fact patterns that ultimately reveal unexpected complexity, allowing schools to use on-campus behavior
related to off-campus speech to ignore the distinction between
the two. A perfect example of this distinction-and of a court
that grasped it unusually well-is Coy ex rel. Coy v. Board of
43
Education.1
Jonathan Coy enjoyed skateboarding with a group of
friends, and to memorialize their exploits, he created a website
using his home computer. 144 In addition to photos of his friends,
the site included a gallery of "losers," North Canton Middle
School students that Coy did not like, with a caption under
each photo, many incorporating insulting and vulgar sentiments. 145 The site also featured profanity, photos of rude gestures, and "a depressingly high number of spelling and grammatical errors."'146 While Coy created the site at home, on one
occasion he used a school computer to access it.147 When school
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Morse v. Frederick, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 2624 (2007).
See Calvert, supra note 5, at 269-73.
205 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
Id. at 795.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 795-96.
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officials discovered the website, Coy was expelled for eighty
days for violating the school's computer use policy.148
On summary judgment, the court faced the question of
what behavior precisely had prompted the discipline. 149 The
school asserted that, because the content of Coy's website was
vulgar, Fraser empowered the school to discipline Coy for its
content. 150 The court rejected this position and focused only on
Coy's access of the site in class-the only behavior the school
could properly regulate. 15 1 Coy produced evidence that the
school district attempted to force his web hosting company to
take down the site, which convinced the court of the existence
of a triable issue of fact as to whether Coy was disciplined for
the creation of the website or for its access in class. 152 If the
former, the court suggested that the school acted unconstitutionally in punishing Coy for off-campus speech.153
The Coy case is illustrative of the problems that courts face
student
cyberspeech cases. The Tinker line of cases estabin
lishes school authority over behavior that occurs within "the
schoolhouse gate[s]." 154 The omnipresence of the Internet, however, provides a ready argument that off-campus cyberspeech is
in some sense always "on campus" as well. When a studentlike Jonathan Coy-accesses his website at school, that behavior only buttresses the school's argument. Therefore, courts
must look carefully to determine whether the punishment
meted out by the school was in fact a consequence of the oncampus behavior, or if it was merely a proxy for punishment of
the off-campus speech. The facts in Coy-in which a student accesses a personal website on a school computer, thus giving rise
to a school's claim of authority to regulate' 55-recur frequently
in student cyberspeech cases. 56 The Coy court's understanding
148. Id. at 796.
149. Id. at 799-801.
150. Id. at 799.
151. Id. at 799-800 ('The extent of Jon Coy's expressive activity was the
private viewing of his own website.").
152. Id. at 800-01 (characterizing the claim that the school punished Coy
only for the access of the site as "implausible").
153. See id. at 801 ("If the school disciplined Coy purely because they did
not like what was contained in his personal website, the plaintiffs will prevail.").
154. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
155. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 795-96.
156. See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F.
Supp. 2d 587, 591 (W.D. Pa. 2007) ("[Layshock] accessed his profile from a
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provides a useful framework for evaluating cyberspeech cases:
while the Tinker test may have applied to Coy's access of the
website, the school could not constitutionally punish Coy for
157
creating the site.
C. THE TINKER STANDARD AND CYBERSPEECH: THE WRONG
TOOL FOR THE WRONG JOB
Unlike the Coy court, most other courts have not found a
coherent way to answer the threshold question of when offcampus cyberspeech becomes student speech. On the one hand,
they have a school with a legitimate and even compelling interest in ensuring the safety and security of both the educational
process and of the student body itself. 158 On the other, they
have immature, even incoherent student cyberspeech lashing
out at school administrators, teachers, and peers in the crudest
of terms, 159 which may hardly seem worthy of protection. However, deciding whether speech may be regulated based on its
content is a determination fraught with First Amendment peril. In desperation, courts have turned to the Tinker test to determine whether or not speech may be regulated. 160 This strategy is ill-advised. The Tinker test is designed to determine
whether expression that is unambiguously student speech may
be censored. It should not, then, be used to determine whether
to begin with a particular expression is student speech. Any offcomputer in the Spanish classroom .... "); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist.,
807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002) ("[T]he record clearly reflects that the off-campus
[website] was accessed by J.S. at school ... ").
157. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 801 ("In this case, the defendants say they disciplined Coy for accessing the website, not for the content of the site. But no
evidence suggests that Coy's acts in accessing the website had any effect upon
the school district's ability to maintain discipline in the school.").
158. See, e.g., Dupre, supra note 135, at 86-88 (noting judicial support for
schools standing in loco parentis over the children in their care).
159. See, e.g., J.S., 807 A.2d at 851 (discussing a website that made derogatory, profane, offensive, and threatening comments about a teacher).
160. Nearly every case set forth in Part I.B.2 eventually analyzes the student expression under the Tinker standard. See, e.g., Killion v. Franklin Reg'l
Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) ("The overwhelming
weight of authority has analyzed student speech (whether on or off campus) in
accordance with Tinker."). The court in Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d
199 (D. Conn. 2007), believed that the Wisniewski precedent meant that Doninger's off-campus speech, if it was reasonably certain that it would come
onto campus, could be regulated under Fraser as lewd and vulgar. See id. at
216 n.l ("[The court] sees no reason to deny the application of Fraserto offcampus speech that affects the school in a reasonably foreseeable manner and
that would otherwise be analyzed under Fraserhad it actually occurred oncampus.").
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campus speech, by any speaker, may create a material and
substantial disruption on campus. If Mary Beth Tinker had appeared on the evening news to protest the Vietnam War, it
could have caused a greater disruption of her school than her
black armband, but such speech should be no more regulable
than was her silent protest. To employ the Tinker test to answer the threshold question of when cyberspeech is student
speech is to use the wrong tool for the wrong job.
The dichotomy of Layshock and J.S. once again illustrates
the problem. In terms of the threshold question of whether the
expression at issue was student speech, the cases are identical:
a website is created off campus, is accessed by the author on
campus a minimal number of times, and causes some disruption of the school environment.161 In both cases, the student argued that his expression was not student speech because it occurred off campus. 162 The J.S. court answered the objection by
resorting to a combination of Swidler's actions in accessing the
website at school and its school-related content to assert that it
was, in essence, on-campus speech. 163 Because Swidler had
taken an affirmative step to bring the speech onto campus, and
because "it was inevitable that the contents of the [website]
would pass from students to teachers, inspiring circulation of
the web page on school property," the court held that the site
was "aimed" at the school and was thus equivalent to oncampus speech.16 4 While this reasoning seems questionable, especially with regard to inevitability, the court was clearly influenced by what it saw as the degree of disruption that flowed
from Swidler's website, which harmed both Mrs. Fulmer the
entire student body. 65 Read together, it becomes clear that the
degree of the disruption moved the court to overlook the paucity of contacts between Swidler's speech and the school; the
court leapt over, in essence, meaningful consideration of the
threshold question in favor of a condemnation of the speech and
its effects.
The Layshock court conducted a more penetrating analysis
in reaching its conclusion, but in the end also relied on the disruption to the school. After considering various theories of
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

site).

See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 590-93; J.S., 807 A.2d at 850-53.
See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 599-600; J.S., 807 A.2d at 864.
J.S., 807 A.2d at 865.
Id.
See id. at 869 (detailing disruptive events caused by Swidler's web-

1228

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:1206

school power, it concluded that the burden was on the school "to
establish that it had the authority to punish the student....
[by] demonstrat[ing] an appropriate nexus" between the offcampus cyberspeech and the on-campus disruption. 166 It determined that the school failed to establish this nexus, because
the disruption itself was "minimal," and because of "several
gaps in the causation link" between Layshock's MySpace profile
and the minimal disruption. 167 So, as in J.S., the Layshock
court paid more heed to the degree and nature of the disruption
ex post than to the nature of the speech and its relationship to
the school ex ante in deciding whether or not it was regulable
student speech.
The Tinker test is very good for examining a factual record
and determining whether or not on-campus speech was in fact
disruptive, and thus vulnerable to suppression. It has significantly less utility for conducting a nuanced, careful analysis of
whether speech that has in fact caused a disruption was student speech. The Wisniewski decision 168 exposes the inherent
danger when courts use disruption to justify stepping over the
threshold inquiry. Wisniewski requires only that it be reasonably foreseeable that the speech will reach campus; once on
campus it must be reasonably foreseeable that the speech will
cause a disruption. 169 Thus, Wisniewski effectively removes all
restraints on a school's power to regulate student cyberspeech.
Aaron Wisniewski was in eighth grade when he created his IM
icon-it should come as no surprise that among his online buddies were many of his classmates. 170 It should also come as no
surprise that he and his buddies might use the Internet to talk
about school and to sound off against teachers and the administration. Wisniewski crossed a line, but it was not the line between on-campus and off-campus speech. Wisniewski crossed
the line between appropriate and inappropriate off-campus expression, which is not a line that the school should police.
The Wisniewski decision also highlights a problem that
lurks beneath all the student cyberspeech cases: the danger of
content-based judgments coloring what should be neutral jurisdictional determinations. The types of behavior that escape

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
Id. at 600.
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
See id. at 39-40.
Id.
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regulation-online jokes, 17 1 parodies, 172 and general vulgarity
and bad taste173-seem fundamentally nonobjectionable. By
and large, they fall into the broad, tolerant category of "kids
will be kids" behavior. 174 The student speech that courts find
subject to regulation, on the other hand-Swidler's vituperations at Mrs. Fulmer 175 and Wisniewski's IM icon176-usually
falls on the objectionable, even dangerous, side of the equation. 177 There would be nothing fundamentally troubling about
that dichotomy if the courts at issue found the dangerous
speech to be truly threatening, and thus unprotected by the
First Amendment. 178 In both cases, however, they declined to
do So.179
Unless a student's cyberspeech falls into one of the categories of speech unprotected by the First Amendment, it deserves
full First Amendment protection. For courts to consider the
content of speech before determining that school-speech precedents apply smacks of a content-based regulation of speech. 8 0
Content-based rules are subject to the most heightened level of
judicial review, strict scrutiny. 181 The Tinker test itself is content-neutral; 8 2 deciding which speech it applies to based on the
171. See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 591 (recounting an offensive MySpace website created as a joke).
172. See Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089

(W.D. Wash. 2000) (describing a website that was created as a parody of a
high school's home page).
173. See Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 795 (N.D.
Ohio 2002) (discussing a website that made profane and insulting comments
about other students).
174. Sandy S. Li, Note, The Need for a New, Uniform Standard:The Continued Threat to Internet-Related Student Speech, 26 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
65, 66-67 (2005) (arguing that courts place too much emphasis on the dangers
of student violence and are not sufficiently tolerant of juvenile behavior) (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 851 (Pa. 2002).
176. See Wisniewski v. Bd.of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35-36 (2d Cir. 2007).
177. See Calvert, supra note 5, at 267 (positing variables for determining
the status of speech based on its content).
178. Cf. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003) (holding that crossburning may constitute a true threat).
179. See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38-39; J.S., 807 A.2d at 860.
180.

See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF

SPEECH § 3:3 (2007) ("When the government's purpose is disagreement with
the message, the regulation is obviously content-based.").
181. See id. § 4:1 ("The strict scrutiny test is the default standard for measuring the content-based regulation of speech.").
182. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969). The government's decision to regulate speech that substantially dis-
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content of that speech is decidedly not. Further, using the
Tinker test to decide when off-campus student cyberspeech may
be regulated has the potential to significantly chill student cyberspeech. When Tinker applies, if a student vents about a
teacher online, any disruption of the school-whether caused
by the student or by anyone who reads the site, including the
targeted teacher-could lead to censorship and punishment.
Knowledge of this state of affairs would deter any reasonable
student from expressing herself online. To eliminate the danger
of chilling effects over student online expression and to avoid
the perils of sub rosa content-based determinations, courts
must therefore adopt a more systematic framework for evaluating school claims of authority over student cyberspeech.
III. THE "PERSONAL JURISDICTION" OF SCHOOLS OVER
STUDENT CYBERSPEECH: AN ANALOGY AND A
PROPOSAL
As demonstrated above, to determine when a student's online speech constitutes student speech, courts have relied on an
ad hoc application of Tinker, a test designed to accomplish a
completely different function. However, courts have at their
disposal a robust jurisprudential mechanism that they may
readily adapt to evaluate a school's claim of authority over a
student's off-campus cyberspeech: the rules of personal jurisdiction. The personal jurisdiction rules establish by analogy a method for courts to determine whether or not a particular expression is vulnerable to school regulation without regard to its
content. At the same time, they protect both the speaker's in-

rupts the educational process applies without regard to the content of that
speech. See SMOLLA, supra note 180, § 3:3. The post-Tinker cases do not universally establish content-neutral rules. Hazelwood does because it applies
when a reader might mistake a student's speech for that of the school, regardless of its content. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271
(1988). Fraser may enable content-based regulation when an administrator
feels speech is vulgar, Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685
(1986), but many courts have limited Fraserto compulsory-attendance activities, such as school assemblies. Morse established a rule that is contentbased-speech advocating drug use is regulable because of its content-but
the Court justified that rule based on the extremely narrow category of prohibited speech, and the exceedingly compelling justification of preventing student drug abuse. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007). Justice Samuel Alito in his narrowing concurrence argued that speech advocating illegal
drug use poses a direct threat to the safety of the school environment. Id. at
2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
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terest in unfettered expression and the school's need for an orderly educational environment.
Part III does not claim that the jurisdictional inquiry in
student cyberspeech cases is identical to a determination of a
state's personal jurisdiction over a non domiciliary. Nor is the
suggested inquiry meant to supplant the tests developed in
Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse. Rather, Part III suggests that when examining off-campus cyberspeech, before conducting any of those analyses-for example, whether a substantial disruption took place or whether speech was lewd or
vulgar--courts should first consider, by analogy to the rules of
personal jurisdiction, the threshold question of whether a particular exercise of school authority is supported by minimum
contacts with the school environment such that the authority
does not offend notions of fair play and substantial justice. 8 3
A. THE STRUCTURES AND POLICIES OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state may
deprive an individual of "life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."'18 4 Through the doctrine of personal jurisdiction,

the Supreme Court ensures that no lower court that passes
judgment over a party beyond the borders of its state does so in
a way that offends due process. 185 The Court's classical personal jurisdiction doctrine sharply limited a court's ability to reach
beyond the territorial boundaries of its home state. 8 6 The modern test for personal jurisdiction, however, is a more flexible
evaluation. Under the modern test, a court must consider the
relationship between the defendant, the acts in question, and
the forum in order to determine whether the potential defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state
such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him does not
183.

The rough contours of a similar approach are suggested in a footnote

in Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation of Student Cyberspeech, HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. (forthcoming) (manuscript
at 51-52 n.241, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031509). However,
Denning and Taylor suggest, in passing, applying only Internet-specific personal jurisdiction concepts to student cyberspeech, rather than employing
more fundamental personal jurisdiction principles to evaluate the character of
student cyberspeech. See id.
184. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
185. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) ("[The] clause
does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.").
186. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877).
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offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'18 7 Personal jurisdiction thus serves dual policy goals-it

safeguards individual liberty from unjust extensions of state
power, l8 8 while regulating the states' relationships with one
another in a manner consistent with the American system of
federalism. 8 9
The simplest and most fundamental basis for personal jurisdiction is the defendant's physical presence in the forum

state, 190 even when that presence is temporary. 19 1 If the defen-

dant is not physically present in the forum, the party asserting
jurisdiction must prove that the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state that are sufficient to support jurisdiction without offending traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. 92 The cornerstone of the inquiry is whether
or not the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privileges and protections of the forum state-if so, he should reasonably foresee being haled into court there. 193 The unilateral
actions of third parties are never sufficient to create personal
jurisdiction, 194 nor is the mere fact that a defendant's product
might foreseeably reach the forum state via the stream of
187. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)
("[Personal jurisdiction] protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.").
189. Id. ("[Personal jurisdiction] acts to ensure that the States, through
their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system."); cf. John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1016 (1983)
("Federalism has no role in the decision ... but the cases explain that federalism is nonetheless preserved when personal jurisdiction is an issue in a
case."). But see Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10 (1982) ("The restriction on state sovereign power ...
must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.").
190. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990)
("Among the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in
American tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present in the State.").
191. See id. at 610-11 (noting that personal jurisdiction is appropriate over
a defendant present within the state "no matter how fleeting his visit").
192. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
193. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) ("This 'purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into
a jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts
194. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ('The unilateral activity
of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.").
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commerce. 195 In the case of intentional conduct, a defendant
may subject himself to jurisdiction in a distant forum by committing a tort aimed at a citizen of that state such that the forum state is the focus of the harm suffered. 196 This effects test
has also been applied to intentional tortious conduct over the
Internet.197

Once minimum contacts have been established, the court
must determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction
under the facts at hand is justified under traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.1 98 In conducting this step of
the analysis, courts balance the various interests at stake, including the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute,
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining effective relief, and the burden on the non resident of defending the suit in a remote location. 199 This inquiry is a flexible one, and even where minimum
contacts exist, a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction when
it would be fundamentally unfair. 200
B. MINIMUM CONTACTS WITH THE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT
The concerns and policies underlying personal jurisdiction
are applicable by analogy to the problem of student cyberspeech. Just as it proved unworkable to restrict a state's juris195. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98
(1980) (holding that a consumer's unilateral action of driving a car from New
York to Oklahoma was not a sufficient basis for Oklahoma to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the dealer); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102, 110-12 (1987) (holding that mere awareness that its products
would be sold in California was not a sufficient basis for California to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer).
196. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984) ("California is the
focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered. Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on the 'effects' of their Florida
conduct in California.").
197. See Imo Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265-66 (3d Cir.
1998) (applying a modified Calder "effects test" to a business tort committed
via the Internet (internal quotation marks omitted)). Where commerce conducted over the Internet is the asserted basis for personal jurisdiction, courts
have frequently applied the test developed in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., which measures the interactivity of the website at issue to
determine whether or not it may give rise to personal jurisdiction. 952 F.
Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
198. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
199. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.
200. See id. at 113-16 (overturning state exercise of jurisdiction, even
where eight Justices agreed that minimum contacts existed, because the balance of interests pointed solidly against state jurisdiction over two foreign corporations).
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diction to those individuals who happen to be within its borders, basing a school's authority on purely geographical considerations would be inadequate to the boundary-defying nature of
online speech. 20 1 A court analyzing a school's claim of authority
over student cyberspeech should first determine whether or not
that speech has sufficient minimum contacts with the school
environment. This Section thus returns to the facts of the student cyberspeech cases to analyze them in terms of minimum
contacts. This Section will examine on-campus speech, offcampus speech, off-campus speech brought onto campus by
third parties, and off-campus speech that might foreseeably
reach campus.
1. On-Campus Cyberspeech
Presence in the forum, or on campus, is as compelling a basis for school authority over student cyberspeech as it is for
personal jurisdiction. 20 2 When a student uses school computers
during school hours to create online speech, the school should
have the authority to regulate that speech, subject to the limits
laid out in the Tinker line of cases. Therefore, under this
framework, Avery Doninger's e-mail remains vulnerable to
school censorship, as long as the requirements of the Court's
20 3
school-speech precedents are met.

2. Off-Campus Cyberspeech and "Purposeful Availment" of
the School Environment
In cases where cyberspeech is created off-campus, but has
a clear and unambiguous connection to the school environment,
the court should examine the purported connection between the
speech and the school to determine whether the student purposefully availed herself of the school environment in creating
the speech. The cases on record establish two basic forms of
this type of connection: student access of off-campus websites at
201. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp.
2d 587, 598 (W.D. Pa. 2007) ("It is clear that the test for school authority is not
geographical."); Johnson & Post, supra note 79, at 1370-71 (noting that physical territorial borders are meaningless in cyberspace).
202. The difference, of course, between personal jurisdiction and student
cyberspeech in this case is that while the presence of the defendant is sufficient for the jurisdiction of a court, the speech itself must be "present" in the
school-created there-in order to be automatically subject to regulation by
the school.
203. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 205 (D. Conn. 2007)
(noting that Avery's e-mail was sent from a school computer lab).
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school, and off-campus cyberspeech that intentionally causes
harm within the school environment.
When a student accesses her personal, off-campus website
during school hours on a school computer, she establishes a
contact between the off-campus speech and the school environment. 20 4 A court must then determine whether that particular
contact establishes that she purposefully availed herself of the
school environment. Factors that a court should consider in
making this determination include whether the access happened only once or multiple times; whether the student merely
viewed the site herself or showed it to others; and the student's
purpose in accessing the site-was it accessed in school for a
school-related purpose, or merely incidentally during school
hours? 205 If the student has accessed the site only once, has not
shown it to any other students, and accessed it for reasons
completely unrelated to school, the access itself does not20 dem6
onstrate purposeful availment of the school environment.
The second way in which a student might purposefully
avail herself of the school environment is by intentionally targeting the school environment with an aim to doing harm
there. It is conceivable that a student could create a web page
entirely off campus with the intent that it be read at school and
thus cause harm to a student, teacher, or the educational
process itself.20 7 Under the effects test set forth in Calder v.
Jones, such intentional conduct could conceivably form the ba-

204.

See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 591 (noting that Layshock accessed

his profile from a Spanish classroom); Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.
Supp. 2d 791, 795-96 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (recounting one-time in-school access
of a website by Coy); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 851-52
(Pa. 2002) (stating that Swidler showed "Teacher Sux" to another student at
school).
205. These factors are interpolations of the fact situations faced by courts
in the student cyberspeech cases. See e.g., Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 591
(finding that Layshock did not access his website for a school-related purpose);
Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 795-96 (describing how Coy only accessed his website
once at school); J.S., 807 A.2d at 852 (observing that Swidler showed his website to only one other student at school).
206. See Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 799 ("The extent of Jon Coy's expressive
activity was the private viewing of his own website."); see also J.S., 807 A.2d
at 870 (Zappala, J., concurring) ("[T]he fact that a [website] is merely accessed

at school by its originatoris an insufficient basis upon which to base a characterization of the speech as on-campus speech.").
207. Cf. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979)
('We can, of course, envision a case in which a group of students incites substantial disruption within the school from some remote locale.").
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sis for personal jurisdiction. 208 The adoption of this rule in the
student cyberspeech arena could threaten to swallow the distinction between on-campus and off-campus cyberspeech, since
most student online expression will likely concern the school in
some respect. When a student spends half her time at school, it
should come as no surprise that a substantial portion of her cyberspeech addresses the school environment.
However, the crux of the effects test in both Calder v.Jones
and in Imo Industries, Inc. v. Keikert AG, which applied Calder's rule to the Internet, is the intent to cause harm. 20 9 Harm
alone in a remote forum does not necessarily support jurisdiction;210 intentional harm, however, makes such jurisdiction
more reasonable. 21 1 Therefore, a determination of whether a
student's "targeting" of the school environment via off-campus
cyberspeech supports school authority should depend on
whether the student intended to cause harm in the school. 212 In
J.S., Swidler's website certainly caused harm within the school
environment. 2 13 Whether Swidler intended to cause that harm,
however, is unclear from the opinion. The presence of a disclaimer stating that all visitors to the site agreed not to disclose
its existence to any employees of the school, 2 14 for instance,
might argue against a finding of intent on Swidler's part. Had
Swidler intended that his website cause harm to the teachers
and administrators of his school, that would have constituted
purposeful availment under the effects test. But absent such
intent, the school should have no authority to punish him for
his off-campus cyberspeech, because that speech did not possess minimum contacts with the school environment.

208. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984) (holding that intentional conduct aimed at a citizen of another state and that causes harm in that
state gives rise to personal jurisdiction in that state).
209. See id.; Imo Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265-66 (3d Cir.
1998).
210. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
295-96 (1980).
211. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-89.
212. While Calderrelied on the fact of harm to support jurisdiction, Tinker
makes clear that schools are not required to wait for a disruption to occurthey may suppress speech if they reasonably forecast substantial disruption.
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
213. See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 852 (Pa. 2002)
(noting that Mrs. Fulmer had to take a medical leave of absence due to the
"Teacher Sux" website (internal quotation marks omitted)).
214. Id. at 851.
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Deciding whether or not a particular speaker intended to
cause harm in the school is not a task amenable to a bright-line
test. A judge faced with such a situation must evaluate the nature and quality of the speech in light of the totality of the circumstances and decide whether the speaker intended to cause
harm directly, or to induce others to cause harm. A judge must
do so, however, mindful of the fact that harm in the school can
arise from myriad causes. Unless such harm is attributable directly to the intentional actions of the online student speaker,
the school should have no power to censor the speech.
3. Off-Campus Cyberspeech and the Unilateral Actions of
Third Parties
It seems inevitable that regardless of a disclaimer, word of
Swidler's website would eventually reach campus. Over and
over in the student cyberspeech cases, a third party-typically
another student-brings a speaker's off-campus cyberspeech on
campus. 215 Once again, the jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction provides a ready analogue to such situations. The unilateral actions of third parties never suffice to subject a nonresident defendant to the judicial power of a particular state. 216 A
student should likewise not be subject to the power of a school
to censor speech merely because a third party brings that
2 17
speech inside the schoolhouse gates.
Neither the purpose nor the effect of this rule, however,
would hamstring school administrators' efforts to secure an orderly school environment. When the principal of Kentlake High
School saw the report about Nick Emmett's so-called hit list, he
need not have sat on his hands merely because he found out

215. See, e.g., Latour v. Riverside Beaver Sch. Dist., No. Civ. A. 05-1076,
2005 WL 2106562, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2005) (finding that violent songs
that were published on the Internet or sold in the community were not
brought to school by the student); Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F.
Supp. 2d 446, 448-49 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (recounting that an offensive list that a
student e-mailed to the home computers of his friends had been distributed on
school grounds by another student); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30
F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177-78 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (describing that a friend accessed
the student's vulgar homepage during school hours without the student's authorization).
216. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
217. See, e.g., Alexander G. Tuneski, Note, Online, Not on Grounds: Protecting Student Internet Speech, 89 VA. L. REV. 139, 177-78 (2003) (proposing a
bright-line test of whether or not the speaker took an affirmative act to bring
the speech on campus).
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about the site on the evening news. 2 18 Unilateral actions of
third parties should never be sufficient, in and of themselves, to
justify a school's censorship of student cyberspeech. But thirdparty reports remain an essential tool in helping make school
administrators aware of situations that might require intervention, if the rest of the jurisdictional predicates are met. So, if
school administrators first learn of potentially problematic cyberspeech from third parties, they are not therefore precluded
from conducting an investigation into the speech to determine
whether or not additional sufficient minimum contacts with the
school environment exist. It would be a reactionary administration that relied exclusively on the report of a third-party student to discipline another student. Such behavior should be
discouraged by the courts.
4. Off-Campus Cyberspeech, Foreseeability, and the Stream of
Commerce Theory
The final category of potential contacts between online
speech and the school environment is the "reasonably foreseea2 19
ble" exception created by the Second Circuit in Wisniewski.
This rule also has a close analogue in the domain of personal
jurisdiction-the so-called stream of commerce theory. 220 The
Supreme Court rejected the pure stream of commerce theory,
holding that foreseeability alone is not a sufficient basis for
personal jurisdiction. 221 Similarly, mere foreseeability that a
particular online expression might reach the schoolhouse gates
should not suffice to justify censorship of that speech, absent
additional conduct by the student that indicates an intent to
partake of the school environment.
Properly applied, this rule should have prevented punishment of Aaron Wisniewski for his AOL Instant Messenger (IM)
icon. 222 The very nature and structure of an instant messaging
218. See Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089
(W.D. Wash. 2000) (recounting exposure of Emmett's website on the local
news).
219. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2007).

220. See, e.g., Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d
761, 766 (Ill. 1961) (holding that a component manufacturer that sold its component to a third party could be haled into court in the state where injury occurred, because the item was launched into the stream of commerce and injury
in the forum state was thus foreseeable).
221. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)
('[F]oreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal

jurisdiction....").
222. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35-36.
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program dictate that any IM communication sent by a student
might foreseeably make its way onto campus. As noted above,
given the nature of a middle school student's life, his peer
group is inevitably composed of fellow students. It would be
surprising if Wisniewski, an eighth-grader, had fifteen IM buddies who were not fellow students at Weedsport Central. Therefore, permitting censorship of instant messages based on mere
foreseeability swallows any meaningful protections of student
cyberspeech. When all online speech might eventually make it
onto school grounds, all speech becomes fair game for suppression by the school.
Requiring additional behavior on the part of students of a
type illustrated above-for example, intentional harm or repeated on-campus access-would properly limit the application
of the foreseeability rule. The foreseeability rule derogates an
essential function of the protection of speech in our society: the
necessity of free speech as a "safety valve."223 One major purpose of a school is to impose discipline and order upon frequently fractious and rebellious students. 224 It is natural, even inevitable, that students will become frustrated with their
teachers and administrators, and will occasionally speak out
against them in anger and irritation. Given the general migration of student speech online, it is no surprise that this angry
speech will be expressed via MySpace, Facebook, IM, e-mail,
and any number of other Internet vehicles. Absent purposeful
activity connecting this speech with the school environment,
there is no reason why a school should be any freer to censor
22 5
speech just because it appears on the Internet.

223. Cf. Calvert, supra note 5, at 282 ("The Internet . . . provides a new
medium on which students can express their frustrations and feelings. Swidler
[of J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District] was using this medium as a passive
outlet . . .for his anger and rage. We should be thankful that he was using
speech and not a gun to express his emotions." (emphasis omitted)).
224. See Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, The Hazelwood Progeny:
Autonomy and Student Expression in the 1990's, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 379,
385 (1995) ("To help our children develop real autonomy, we must help them
temporarily submit their immediate freedom to the schoolmaster of educational discipline, limiting their freedom temporarily through 'compulsory education' that enhances their capacity for the meaningful exercise of freedom.").
225. See Tuneski, supra note 217, at 177-78.
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C. FAIR PLAY AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN THE CONTEXT OF
STUDENT CYBERSPEECH

Once a court determines that a student's cyberspeech does
have minimum contacts with the school environment, it must
then ask whether or not the school's exercise of authority offends notions of fair play and substantial justice. This evaluation should strike a balance between two conflicting, but equally valid, interests: the interest of the student in the right of
unrestrained expression, and the interest of the school in maintaining an orderly educational environment. 226
The student's interest in unfettered expression and substantial legal protection of speech is readily apparent, and
should be accorded great weight. Unless the speech falls into
one of the carefully delineated categories of expression that
does not enjoy First Amendment protection-for instance, if it
is a true threat-that speech, no matter how offensive, juvenile,
or vulgar, should be entirely protected. On the other hand,
schools have a legitimate interest in ensuring that they can effectively educate their students and prepare them for participation in adult society. 227 In an on-campus setting, the balance of

interests tips in favor of the school. The integrity of the educational process sometimes requires that teachers exercise a degree of control over their students that the students find distasteful. The process, however, frequently requires such
control. 228 On campus, student expression sometimes must be
controlled in order to guarantee that students are prepared to
effectively partake in the unfettered marketplace of ideas once
they exit the schoolhouse gates permanently. 229
When a student expresses herself online, however, the balance of interests shifts solidly in her direction. Part of learning
to engage in adult society is learning that different rules apply
in different settings. Preventing schools from overregulating
student online behavior could reinforce a student's comprehension that while some kinds of behavior may be tolerated on the
Internet, the same behavior will not pass muster in the
226. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 524
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting) ("Uncontrolled and uncontrollable liberty is an
enemy to domestic peace."); Hafen & Hafen, supra note 224, at 385.
227. See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 224, at 385.
228. See Dupre, supra note 135, at 67 ("[The school plays a vital part in
creating a sense of community and molding character based on a shared philosophy.").

229.

See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 224, at 385.
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school.230 In addition, carefully and specifically drawing lines
beyond which schools may not reach may actually encourage
parents to take a more active part in their children's online activities. Just as personal jurisdiction helps maintain the federal
balance between the states, 23 1 a clearer separation between the
spheres of authority of parents and of schools could help to clarify the scope of authority for both.232
D. APPLYING THE MODEL TO UNTANGLE THE
BONGHITS4JESUS.coM HYPOTHETICALS
Under
this
personal-jurisdiction-based
model,
the
BH4J.com hypotheticals previously propounded may now be
unraveled. In the first situation, in which Frederick's site advocates for legalization of marijuana, Principal Morse has no authority to regulate the website-Frederick has not purposefully
availed himself of the school environment, and Morse's discovery of the site through a random Google search is entirely unrelated to the school. Furthermore, because the content of the site
is unmistakably political in nature, it may not be regulable under Morse, even if it were classified as on-campus. The second
hypothetical, in which Frederick accesses the site during a
computer lab class and shows a friend at school, presents a
closer call. In that case, the court must evaluate Frederick's intent in accessing the site. If Frederick accessed it only once, only showed its contents to one classmate, and intended no inschool effect, no school jurisdiction should follow.
The third variation, in which Frederick posts a floor plan of
the school with an ominous countdown and message, presents
the "intent to harm" type of purposeful availment, which is regulable under the effects test. The content of BH4J.com in this
hypothetical raises a strong inference of intent to cause harm
in the school environment. Absent highly probative countervailing evidence of contrary intent, a court should find that Frederick purposefully availed himself of the school environment,
230. See Calvert, supra note 5, at 286 ("A teachable moment arises when
administrators . . . confront students about their speech activities. . . . They
should inform students that the constitutional right of free speech carries with
it a concomitant responsibility not to abuse it.").
231. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
232. See Layrhock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp.
2d 587, 597 (W.D. Pa. 2007) ("Schools have an undoubted right to control conduct within the scope of their activities, but they must share the supervision of
children with other, equally vital, institutions such as families, churches,
community organizations and the judicial system.").
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and thus rendered his website subject to regulation. Note in
this hypothetical that the unilateral action of Frederick's
classmate in telling Principal Morse of the website would not
support school authority on its own, but would certainly lead
Morse to the site, and would allow her the chance to discover
its potentially dangerous content.
The final variation on BH4J.com, in which the content is
vulgar and juvenile and Frederick e-mails the link to fifteen of
his friends, presents the Wisniewski problem. Frederick has
shown the site to so many of his classmates that it is reasonably foreseeable that the site will "come on campus." If he were
unlucky enough to live in the Second Circuit, Frederick's site
could clearly be shut down by the school. Under the framework
presented here, however, the school must demonstrate more
substantial contacts with the school environment before it may
impact Frederick's speech, no matter how objectionable. The
First Amendment, even applied in light of the school environment, should tolerate no less.
E. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
Applying the rules of personal jurisdiction by analogy to
school attempts to censor student cyberspeech provides a systematic way of evaluating schools' claims of authority without
resorting to content-based decision making. However, at least
two distinct objections to the approach may be raised. First, it
could be said that while this framework would help judges
make ex post determinations of the validity of school action, it
does little to aid school administrators or students in making ex
ante decisions about real-world policy. Second, in light of Columbine and other recent incidents, this approach may needlessly tie the hands of school administrators who try to proactively protect their schools from potentially dangerous
students. Neither objection is fatal, and the second actually
points to a systematic benefit that the personal jurisdiction
perspective brings to the question.
1. Administrability
Underlying much of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is
the assumption that a person's purposeful availment of a particular state's laws makes it reasonable and expected that that
person might be haled into the courts of that state. 233 One ob233.

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985).
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jection to that proposition is that, until a court has pronounced
a particular kind of behavior sufficient to support jurisdiction,
no average person could predict what actions will give rise to
jurisdiction and what actions will not. A similar objection could
be made to applying personal jurisdiction principles to student
cyberspeech-how is a principal or a student to know what is
permitted and what is forbidden until a court rules on the issue?
In this case, a difference between student cyberspeech and
personal jurisdiction answers this objection. First, the total universe of possible factual scenarios of school censorship of student cyberspeech is vastly smaller than that of individuals and
their relationships with the laws of the various states. Therefore, under this approach, a body of law should quickly develop
to give administrators a ready set of rules for making these
types of decisions. 234 Second, the very existence of a clear minimum contacts requirement in order for school jurisdiction to
arise is a significantly brighter line than currently exists. Finally, the existence of a framework for review-no matter how
fuzzy its contours-will encourage school administrators to look
more carefully at the facts of a particular situation before blindly censoring student cyberspeech. In an age of ever-increasing
online presence on the part of students, that can only be a good
thing.
2. School Violence and the Availability of Alternative
Remedies
The second major objection to the personal jurisdiction
perspective is that it unfairly ties the hands of school administrators at the very time that they need to be liberated to proactively prevent tragedies. 235 Teachers and principals must be
granted a very free hand so that they can effectively ensure the
physical safety of the school environment. Because troubled
students may pour out their violent plans online, that hand's
reach should extend beyond the schoolhouse gate and onto the
Internet. The flaw in this objection is that it expects far too
much of schools, in terms of the regulation of student behavior.
234. Such a body of bright-line rules has developed in certain areas of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411, 423-24 (1976) (establishing a bright-line rule to avoid needless litigation).
235. See, e.g., Janofsky, supra note 2 (discussing the 1999 shooting at Columbine High School); Chris Maag & Ian Urbina, Student, 14, Shoots 4 and
Kills Himself in Cleveland School, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, at A22 (discussing the 2007 shooting at a Cleveland high school).
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In J.S., the student cyberspeech case involving the most
threatening and potentially disturbing expression, the victim of
Swidler's vituperation had a perfectly adequate means of redress: the civil justice system. 2 36 In addition to requesting a
medical sabbatical, the much-maligned Mrs. Fulmer sued
Swidler for defamation, invasion of privacy, loss of consortium,
and interference with contractual relations. 237 If speech is so
threatening as to become actionable-and this would encompass so-called cyberbullying 23 8-the courts already provide a
remedy. Both the juvenile justice system and the First
Amendment exception for true threats and incitement are sufficient to punish truly dangerous behavior, and denying a
school the authority to censor speech does not strip it of the
ability to refer potentially troubled students to counseling.
Saddling a school with the responsibility of spotting and
neutralizing potentially murderously disaffected students before they can do damage imposes too much responsibility on the
school. The most effective way to ensure that troubled students
receive the help they need is not for schools to zealously police
their every online encounter. That responsibility, rather,
should rest with their parents, who are far better suited to
239
monitor and shape their children's activities on the Internet.
The fundamental fairness assumption underlying the doctrine
of personal jurisdiction is that, even if a particular state cannot
exercise its judicial power over a particular defendant, there is
some state, somewhere, in which the injured party can get redress. Similarly, the responsibility for the well-being of students should neither begin nor end with the school; schools are
only one part of the community- and family-based network for
watching out for our nation's most vulnerable citizens: its
children.240

236.

Calvert, supra note 5, at 247-48.

237.
238.

Id.
Cf. Thomas E. Wheeler II, Lessons from The Lord of the Flies: The Re-

sponsibility of Schools to Protect Students from Internet Threats and Cyber-

Hate Speech, 215 EDUC. L. REP. 227, 244 (2007) ("[Wlhile school administrators are given broad discretion [to regulate student speech], they must resist
the temptation to over regulate.").
239. See id. at 244 ("[T]he ethical responsibility for individual conduct must
rest with the individual, and not the schools. The primary teachers in this regard are parents and families, not governmental agencies.").
240. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp.
2d 587, 597 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
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CONCLUSION
Student cyberspeech presents a tempting target for school
administrators. Their students, who in class may be sullen and
uncommunicative, are transformed into loquacious, vibrant
community members online and post their innermost thoughts
and feelings with reckless abandon, for anyone to read. But this
unparalleled access to student speech must not be allowed to
transform into unparalleled censorship of student speech. The
Supreme Court has clearly delineated when a school may censor student expression that takes place on campus. In the
realm of off-campus student cyberspeech, however, both courts
and administrators lack any clear method to determine when a
school has the power to censor student expression. Analogizing
to the principles of personal jurisdiction provides an opportunity for a clear inquiry that does not impermissibly examine the
content of student cyberspeech. This approach would allow administrators to regulate that cyberspeech that might genuinely
be of concern to the school, while at the same time permit
courts to give students' off-campus, online expression the highest degree of First Amendment protection.

